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1CONSIDERATIONS FOR MDG IMPLEMENTATION IN MEXICAN CITIES
INTRODUCTION
As towns and cities grow at unprecedented rates setting the social, political, cultural
and environmental trends of the world, sustainable urbanization is one of the most
pressing challenges facing the global community in the 21st century. During the next
30 years, urban growth will bring a further 2 billion people into the cities of the
developing world, doubling their size (UNHSP 2003). Cities are the hub for much
national production and consumption including the varied economic and social
processes that generate wealth and opportunity. These same economic and social
processes also foster environments of disease, crime, pollution and poverty due to the
competition and exploitation present in industrialized, market-driven societies. In
many cities around the world these contrasting but inseparable conditions of wealth
and poverty, opportunity and marginalization have created an environment in which a
small percentage of wealthy possess a disproportionate amount of the wealth1 and
slum dwellers number more than 50 per cent of the population with little or no access
to shelter, water, and sanitation (Hoffman 1996). Historically, no single factor has
contributed to this inequality as much as the unequal distribution of land (UN Habitat
2005).
Slum settlements are defined in a variety of ways by different locations around the
world. According to a review of the literature on slum settlements around the world,
the three most common aspects of the varying definitions are the illegality of land
tenure, the use of poor-quality construction materials in housing, and the existence or
absence of basic services, (potable water, electricity, and sanitation). While slums can
exist in any geographical location, this paper refers specifically to slums located in the
periphery of cities where residents do not have legal tenure for the property they
occupy, but desire access to the economic and social opportunity of the city. While
slum settlements lack safe housing, basic service provision, and security of land tenure
and experience a wide range of health and safety problems as well as social and
economic limitations, they also fill a crucial void in the housing market for residents
who can’t afford legal or regularized housing or real estate. According to the 2003
Global Report on Human Settlements, the most common reasons for the formation and
growth of slum settlements are rapid rural-to-urban migration, increasing urban
poverty and inequality, insecure tenure, and globalization.
                                                 
1 “Wheras the richest tenth of the population in the region [Latin America] earn 48 percent of total
income, the poorest tenth earn only 1.6 percent. By contrast, in developed countries the top tenth
receive 29 percent of total income, compared to 2.5 percent for the bottom tenth.” (Ferranti 2004:1)
2The purpose of this paper is to investigate the implementation of the United Nations’
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) target intended to improve the living
conditions in low-income settlements and encourage sustainable urban development.
The paper is a result of a ten week research endeavor in the city of Xalapa, Veracruz,
Mexico, sponsored by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN
Habitat) Mexico City office, to investigate the state of land tenure procedures in place
for addressing the global mandate to “achieve significant improvement in the lives of
at least 100 million slum dwellers by 20202.” The paper describes the main arguments
within the academic literature regarding tenure security and then examines the ways in
which this debate is reflected in policy decisions and local actions in Xalapa, Mexico.
The Xalapa study is primarily based on approximately 40 semi-structured interviews
ranging from thirty minutes to three hours with government officials and academics on
local, state and national levels that participate or specialize in the history or current
state of regularization processes in Mexico. These interviews were accompanied by
the collection and review of work plans, development plans, and organizational
missions and procedures. The interviews and document collection/review were jointly
undertaken by Ashlee McLaughlin3 of the University of Illinois and Jennifer Lewis4 of
Yale University.
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
At the Millennium Summit in September 2000, the largest gathering of world leaders
in history adopted the UN Millennium Declaration, committing their nations to a
renewed global partnership to “uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and
equity at the global level” (United Nations 2000) and setting out a series of time-
bound goals (see Figure 1). With a deadline of 2015 - 2020, these goals have become
known as the Millennium Development Goals. The aforementioned target to improve
the lives of slum dwellers falls under Goal 7, which calls to “ensure environmental
sustainability.” Implicit in MDG discourse is a foundation of global citizenship
wherein the costs and opportunities of globalization can be more equitably and
inclusively shared. The translation of this global mandate into effective local
initiatives is an important and complicated task with a number of potential obstacles to
consider.
Within academic discussion, there is an increasingly recognized need to address the
MDGs, the assumptions upon which they were founded and ultimately their expected
and actual success. To begin, how is it possible to bridge the globally mandated
                                                 
2 The Millennium Declaration cites the Cities Alliance’s Cities Without Slums Action Plan as the
foundation for Target 11. A partnership between UN Habitat and the World Bank, the Cities Alliance
was started in 1999 to mobilize funds and facilitate practices specifically committed to improving the
living conditions of the urban poor around the world.
3 Ashlee McLaughlin is a Masters Candidate in the department of Urban and Regional Planning at the
University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign.
4 Jennifer Lewis is a dual Masters Candidate in the schools of Forestry and International Relations at
Yale University.
3MDGs with tangible actions on the ground in developing countries already suffering
from debilitating shortages of lack of funding and other resources? In addition, Payne
(2005) questions the value of using the MDGs as realistic targets for development
initiatives. For example, his evidence suggests that even if Target 11 is achieved, only
11 percent of existing slums will be sufficiently upgraded, and only 7 percent of future
estimated upgrading needs, by 2020. In addition, recent initiatives within UN Habitat
have facilitated a timely discussion of tenure provision as it relates to Target 11.
An important tool for addressing Target 11, UN Habitat’s Global Campaign for Secure
Tenure is one of only two global campaigns within the Habitat division, indicating the
amount of importance they place on secure tenure as a path to achieving their mission
to improve the quality of life in illegal slum settlements, and there is a large body of
evidence to back this up. The outcomes of unstable tenure that this campaign aims to
combat include the inability to mobilize household capital, participate in local
government, establish firm geographical roots, which subsequently limits social
networks, and to obtain consistent access to employment opportunities (UN Habitat
2003). Further justification of tenure security provision includes tenure as a means to
reduce structural vulnerability of precarious housing conditions, susceptibility to
harassment or expulsion that residents of informal areas tend to endure, poor access to
basic services and detrimental ramifications to the environment due to lack of
planning (Durand-Lasserve 2006). As evidenced in the following section, the myriad
ways that tenure is defined for policy application to address urban living conditions
demands much-needed flexibility as well as presents a fundamental challenge to
successful achievement of Target 11.
TENURE DEBATE
Secure tenure is cited within UN Habitat’s Global Campaign for Secure Tenure as a
fundamental component for addressing MDG 7 (UN 2005). There exists a wide array
of different tenure definitions that form the basis of contentious debate regarding the
value of prioritizing this factor as a fundamental step towards achieving these goals
within both urban and peri-urban environments. The tenure categories included in
what Payne (2000) terms “the tenure continuum” are 1) Pavement dweller, 2) Squatter
tenant, 3) Squatter `owner’ - un-regularized, 4) Tenant in unauthorized subdivision, 5)
Squatter `owner’ – regularized, 6) Owner - unauthorized subdivision, 7) Legal owner -
unauthorized construction, 8) Tenant with contract, 9) Lease-holder, 10) Free-holder.
These categories become even more complex when trying to take the bundles of rights
(access to services and amenities such as water, electricity, markets, schools, and civic
centers) associated with specific locations into account. Accordingly, responses to
tenure insecurity also vary according to local contexts, types and diversity of irregular
settlements, governments’ political orientations, and pressures from civil society and
from local voters. Broadly, however, there are two fundamental approaches: the first
emphasizes formal tenure regularization of land and housing in informal settlements
based on individual freehold titles; this tends to be more difficult legally and in
particular, time consuming. The second approach emphasizes security of tenure
(Durand-Lasserve 2006). This approach does not require the provision of freehold
4individual title, and provides protective administrative or legal measures against
forced evictions and for effective inclusion in service provision including the
provision of titles that can be upgraded, if required, with the connection of basic
services to public utility infrastructure systems.
Support for Formal Tenure Regularization and Individual Freehold Titles
There are several arguments arguing for individual freehold titling as a necessary
precursor for development goals within low-income communities in the urban
periphery consistent with the first approach mentioned above. Inherent in this view is
the ultimate goal of tenure regularization and formal market integration of previously
invisible, informal communities. This discussion has its historical roots in property
rights discourse spearheaded by Turner (1968) that draws connections between
legalization of land rights and housing improvements. Similar arguments have been
set forth by Hernando De Soto, famous for his global quest to "formalize the
informal." De Soto (2000) advocates property ownership as a means to protect assets,
use as collateral for loans and risk sharing for investment, all of which contribute to
economic growth.
More recent research has focused on three main justifications for formal regularization
and household-level titling as the groundwork for further development in the urban
periphery: 1) equalization of land prices in formal and informal markets, 2)
establishing effective cadastral systems for tax collection, and 3) as a foundation for
investment in low-income communities. First, regularization is often viewed as a
means to equalize land prices in urban areas by reducing inflationary trends that lead
to increases in prices of both legal and illegal land due to the rapid pace of
urbanization and urban development (CORETT, pers. comm.). Additionally, a
successful cadastral system on a municipal level is seen as essential for active and
sustainable land markets that reduce fluctuations due to speculation. These official and
standardized records of regularized land allow for more regulated and standardized
purchase, sale and mortgage of land (Williamson 1997). Taxes assessed and collected
as a result of these records can then, theoretically, be reinvested in urban development
projects.
Finally, research on investment in different types of development projects reflects
emphasis on regularization of land and issuance of individual property titles by
international financial institutions as well as governments as a foundation for
investment and in turn, economic development. For many projects, land essentially
represents collateral for loans and other financial involvement in low-income areas.
For example, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) often requires legal
tenure as a prerequisite for credit acquisition for both low-income households to invest
in small-scale projects and local governments requesting funds for municipality-wide
investments (Armstrong 2002). Additionally, Siembieda and Lopez (1997) draw links
between international financing mechanisms based upon goals to achieve improved
housing and urban development that prioritize ‘efficiency’ (or regularization) of land
markets. Similarly, Jones and Ward (1994) highlight the centrality of regularization of
land titles within World Bank discourse and project funding.
5Criticism of Formal Tenure Regularization and Individual Freehold Titles
On the other side of the debate, there are those who criticize the conventional belief
that legal regularization and individual property rights are a necessary foundation for
urban development. Evidence shows that in some places the regularization process,
instead of improving the lives of existing slum residents, has actually spurred the
creation of more slum settlements, as many of the existing residents could not afford
the costs involved with regularization and the formal land market, including service
upgrading, heightened construction regulations and taxation (UNCHS 1987). Often, as
land becomes regularized and in turn, more valuable, it becomes a target of "raiding"
by individuals of higher income classes which continually forces the poor out of newly
legalized lands and onto less desirable illegal land (including floodplains, hill sides,
and other risk-prone land) and/or illegal land further away from the city (Burgess 1982
in Varley 2002).
Furthermore, De Souza (1999 and 2001) argues that regularization of informal
settlements also reduces the available land stock in illegal land market, and therefore,
limits the accessibility of even illegal land to the low-income sector. Additional
limitations to the formal regularization process stem from a lack of resources within
the local governments responsible for such processes. Because of the time and cost
required, formal regularization cannot respond effectively to large-scale slum
regularization, particularly in peri-urban areas where migration tends to be more rapid
than regularization (Vargas, pers. comm.). In turn, these conventional uses of tenure
regularization that inevitably occur piecemeal, due in part to administrative
constraints, can break down community cohesion, social links and ability for residents
to participate in community development initiatives (Durand-Lasserve 2006).
Another powerful criticism is offered by Varley (1999) regarding the use of formal
land regularization as a political tool, utilized by the elite for a variety of ends. Most
notably, investing in regularization has the ability to coerce votes for the party in
power, therefore providing necessary security and power structures established within
the status quo. The prioritization of regularized property for investments by the
government also maintains a necessary binary between "legal" and "illegal" (Varley
2002). The implication embedded within this discourse is that the government must
intervene in order to resolve this dispute and legitimize, or formalize, these informal
communities, thus reinforcing a political use of illegality to justify state paternalism.
This criticism is echoed by Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan (2002) in describing new,
dynamic conceptualizations of property rights that correspond to a global reality of
legal pluralism. This work suggests that policy that relies principally on statutory law
to develop rigid and so-called "efficient" property rights do not recognize multiple
claims for property rights and varying strategies by which people achieve access and
control over resources, an oppression that disproportionately burdens low-income
populations who don’t or can’t participate in the formal land market.
6Support for Tenure Security Without Immediate Regularization
Consistent with the second, more flexible approach to providing tenure security,
innovative case studies from around the world have attempted to offer alternative
approaches to addressing urban poverty and development goals, without relying solely
on regularization and individual titling as the foundation for the initiative. Case studies
from around the world highlighting the successes of community land trusts, city-wide
infrastructure upgrading and targeted housing subsidies, just to name a few, all
provide valuable insight on alternatives to formal land regularization. Research by
Durand-Lasserve (1998) also highlights the prioritization of urban needs, suggesting
that basic service and infrastructure provision are more urgent action areas than tenure.
This is reiterated by several authors who advocate improvement of basic services and
increase "rights" without major changes to tenure status within urban landscapes (de
Souza 2001; Payne 2000).  Other studies have shown the importance of geographic
proximity to work opportunities and fiscal policy mechanisms for serviced-land
acquisition as future key elements of urban development (Payne 2000; Iracheta 2000).
Recent work has challenged traditional definitions of tenure security, rejecting the
existing binary between legal and illegal that governments often maintain. The
heterogeneity of tenure claims and rights among urban dwellers is beginning to be
examined and at times local recognition of land rights confers enough security so as to
make state recognition unnecessary (Nuijten 2003). Often, informal arrangements and
squatting are culturally accepted means of procuring land for low-income families,
and thus institutionalized on national scales (Iracheta 2000). Indeed, in many case
studies, de facto tenure has provided enough security of land rights and potential
housing improvements that legal titles become obsolete (Varley 2002). These
approaches recognize a range of meanings and applications of tenure, as referenced
earlier in Payne’s continuum, rather than assuming that legalization is necessary or
even a positive component of urban development initiatives.
From a multi-national standpoint, UN-Habitat also recognizes a range of tenure local
situations, adhering more closely with the second definition of secure tenure (Durand-
Lasserve 2006). On a local level, the UN-Habitat defers to context-specific definitions
for tenure and oftentimes promotes global goals through pathways established by
existing discourse, in turn legitimizing practices for securing tenure that exist in
particular countries (ibid., Rodriguez pers. comm.). In order to evaluate the potential
application of MDG policies in Mexico, it is important to consider the potential
application of this conceptualization of tenure security and the opportunities and
challenges existing on local levels of government responsible for improving the living
conditions in illegal slum settlements.
7URBANIZATION AND THE PHENOMONON OF EJIDOS IN MEXICO
Rapid urbanization trends in Mexico make this country an important case study to
examine changes in urban environments and potential options to develop sustainable
and inclusive cities. According to 2001 estimates, the urban population of Mexico is
approximately 75% of the total population and is estimated to increase to 85% within
25 years (UNHS 2001). Data also indicate that 10% of the urban population lacks
potable water, 4.5% lack electricity and 20.9% lack proper drainage systems (See
Table 1, UN Habitat 2005). Many of these households exist in the periphery areas of
cities, as migrants establish homes through informal acquisition where land is
accessible but largely un-serviced. Over the last 20 years, the informal sector has
produced more than 60% of housing in major Mexican cities (Lemus 1994 in
Siembieda and Lopez 1997).
The peri-urban interface in Mexican cities is a complex geographical zone of often
overlapping and contested land rights. Many informal land market trends are couched
within a long history of land rights in Mexico, principally stemming from land reforms
enacted after the Mexican Revolution in 1917. Originally surrounding many urban
settlements, communally run ejido properties were, in part, intended to serve the
agrarian community as a way to protect their livelihood and sustain agricultural
production in Mexico. This reform established the ejido tenure form, communal land
that confers use rights for cultivation yet remains property of the nation. Under the
1992 Agrarian Law reform, ejido members were given rights to vote to change tenure
regime, granting them the power to sell, rent, sharecrop, or mortgage the land
(Appendini 2001). Since the bureaucratic process of transferring land-use designations
and ownership rights for these properties is time-consuming and legally cumbersome
however, the legal right to sell the land is often surpassed for faster, technically illegal,
methods of subdividing, selling and distributing land use rights.
The urban footprint of many Mexican cities, including Mexico City, Monterrey and
Guadalajara has grown into, through, and sometimes beyond the ejido lands that
originally functioned as the boundary of the city (see figure 2). These settlements are
often qualified as “slums” due to the lack of legal property titles, little or no basic
service provision and the ad-hoc nature of construction and development.
Increasingly, urban expansion and accompanying property demand have increased
land values in ejidos near urban areas often making it more profitable for ejido
leadership in urban or peri-urban areas to subdivide and sell the ejido property than to
use it to practice agriculture (CORETT pers. comm.).
Some of the illegal trends of peri-urban ejido land sales include: selling ejido property
with no use titles, selling the same piece of land several times, subdivide parcels
outside of municipal regulations and without municipal permission, selling land that is
legally designated as prone to hazards such as landslides or flooding. There is also
significant attention drawn to the presence of land speculators, or "leaders," who
operate outside of the law and make a living continually relocating poor households to
new informal settlements only long enough to gain a profit on property value increases
once basic services have been connected or made accessible. There is little existing
8research that documents the scale of this trend outside of our interviews (CORETT,
Hernández, Martinez, and Rodriguez pers. Comm.). Additionally, research has shown
that the cycle of informal settlement and subsequent titling has resulted in a process
that is institutionalized and a culturally accepted means for attaining low-cost land in
urban and peri-urban areas of Mexico(Iracheta 2000). In other words, the residents of
illegal slum settlements in Mexico are not necessarily impoverished and  might have
other options.
Several trends are also apparent among residents that have established homes in this
peri-urban zone. Oftentimes these residents will pay disproportionately high prices for
land with no accompanying services or titles. Conflict and/or dangerous living
conditions can be common if single properties are clandestinely sold to multiple
people or if upon arrival, new owners discover their properties exist on steep hillsides,
or too close to rivers or underground gas pipelines. Additionally, without intervention
from city planners in the subdivision and development of these settlements,
community layouts can result streets that are too narrow for emergency vehicles to
pass, unsafe residential construction, and inadequate or no spatial provision for vital
social services such health clinics, education or green spaces. In these cases the
services must be negotiated retroactively, if possible, and therefore at a greater
financial cost to the provider(s). These potential downfalls are further promoted by the
fact that, historically, tenure and service provision have been dealt with separately in
Mexico (Azuela and Duhau 1998). Even though urban plans recognize that most
future growth will occur on ejido lands within the peri-urban interface, there are few
clear policies to formalize this to attend to existing irregular settlements and reduce the
tendency for irregular settlement formation (Iracheta 2000). It seems that the
residential settlement and development practices in Mexico result from an overall lack
of property rights and regulations enforcement. A Mexico case study report published
by UN Habitat notes dramatic inconsistencies in laws concerning tenure, noting in
particular that possession rights are ambiguous and rarely recognized (UN HABITAT
2005).
Recent policy initiatives have started a forum for discussing the role of tenure
Mexican cities. In May 2007 the Mexican Federal Government presented the Felipe
Calderón Administration’s first five year National Development Plan. Strategy 3.1,
Objective 3 of Axis 3 articulates the goal to "promote regional planning, legal land
tenure and public security in marginal zones of cities." Within the plan are ambitious
platforms for granting tenure to those illegally living on property they do not own,
paired with ambiguous references to service provision as “easier to provide…once
already regularized.” The plan is unclear whether the federal government is willing to
fund infrastructure upgrading in illegal slum settlements and aid in addressing MDG
Target 11, or whether regularization and a residents property “legality” will continue
to determine their access to basic services. With this objective currently positioned at
the national level of discourse and debate, it is an opportune moment to examine
tenure security in the country and its potential use as a tool of equity and justice for
Mexican citizens.
9Case Study: Xalapa, Veracruz
The medium-sized city of Xalapa, Veracruz was chosen by the UN HABITAT office
in Mexico City to evaluate the on-the-ground reality of illegal slum settlements,
service provision initiatives by the local, state and federal governments, and how these
initiatives may or may not coincide with the aims of the MDGs. Research shows that
aggressive urbanization trends, a major contributor to the creation and growth of
informal settlements, are currently greatest in medium-sized cities making Xalapa a
good candidate for this research (Martinez pers. comm.). As of 2005, the urban
population of Xalapa was 413,136 including illegal settlements in the city’s periphery
qualified as slum settlements due to the lack many basic services such as electricity,
water and drainage, among others. Population growth is expected to yield a total
population of anywhere between 456,076 to 474,465 by 2020 (INEGI 2005;
COPLADEVer 2007). Xalapa was also chosen as the research site because of UN
Habitat’s ongoing professional ties to the area resulting from a six year collaborative
effort to foster strategic management and urban planning in local government projects
(UN Habitat 2006).
This case study is primarily based on approximately 40 semi-structured interviews
ranging from thirty minutes to three hours with government officials and academics on
local, state and national levels that participate or specialize in the history or current
state of regularization processes in Mexico. The organizations represented by the
individuals in these interviews included UN HABITAT, the Commission for the
Regularization of Land Tenure, CORETT; the Secretary of Social Development,
SEDESOL; the Veracruz State Institute for Housing and Regional Planning,
InVivienda; the regional Center of Social Anthropology Investigation and Studies,
CIESAS; the Veracruz state development planning committee, COPLADEVER; the
Xalapa municipal cadastre office; the National Autonomous University of Mexico,
and the University of Veracruz. These interviews were augmented by the simultaneous
collection and review of work plans, development plans, organizational missions and
procedures, and site visits to ejido and non ejido settlements in the Xalapa periphery in
order to identify physical and ideological overlap or conflict.
Currently, the processes of government-sponsored tenure regularization and service
provision in Xalapa function sequentially in a timeframe that takes anywhere from 2 –
10+ years from the time of the initiation of the regularization process to the
installation of basic services, including water, electricity, drainage, and sanitation. The
overarching order of formal tenure legalization is determined by existing policy set by
the federal government. Currently this order is: expropriation of ejido lands to the
government, regularization and provision of land titles to current residents, municipal
incorporation and update of cadastral systems and finally, basic service provision as
scarce resources are divided throughout city projects. This sequential order is initiated
only after an ejido leadership council has unanimously agreed to give up their
communal administration rights back to the federal government to divide up
accordingly amongst existing property settlers at the time of the agreement, regardless
of the legality of their residence. The residents who are “awarded” tenure from the
federal government are charged a fee, ($600 Pesos, about $60 USD July 2007), to
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obtain their title in addition to the support from the federal government who maintains
the federal expropriation offices and staff around the country who carry out the
process.
The two most obvious problems facing people illegal occupying land in slum
settlements are related: tenure security and the provision of services (UN Habitat
2003). There is a portion of federal funds distributed to municipalities for use in any
location of the city including illegal settlements as part of a municipal development
funding account, known as “Ramo 33,” specifically distributed for use in wide-ranging
"municipal strengthening" projects (Hernández pers. comm.). However, existing
municipal, state and even national government discourse stipulates that legal tenure in
the form of individual titles is necessary prior to public investment in household and
neighborhood-specific service provision. This prioritization of legal tenure provision
over all other types of investment in periphery informal communities was reiterated by
representatives of the Commission for Regularization of Land Tenure (CORETT),
Secretary of Social Development (SEDESOL) Habitat Program, the municipal
development office, the Veracruz state urban planning office and the Veracruz State
Institute for Housing and Regional Planning. Common justifications for this
prioritization echo the arguments outlined by property rights promoters worldwide,
corresponding to the first broad definition of tenure mentioned earlier in this paper.
One predominant justification for this prioritization was that legality reduced land
speculation in periphery lands, principally in ejido lands that currently are being
subdivided and sold to migrants entering the city, or city residents migrating further
out. These representatives often extended this issue, however, claiming that legality
was the only means by which local and state planning representatives and government
officials can retain some degree of control over future urban expansion without
encouraging illegal subdivisions, settlement and development. Different planning
representatives at both the state and local level claimed to be in competition with large
land speculators who intend to make money off of illegal purchases of land in peri-
urban areas throughout Mexico. These representatives not only justified but also
adamantly declared that legalization of these communities was the only means by
which development should occur and land speculation kept under control, regardless
of the numbers of Xalapa residents without access to basic services (Basic service
access statistics for Xalapa unknown, see Table 1 for  basic service access statistics
nation-wide).
Throughout the course of interviews with these same state and city planning and
development stakeholders, it became clear that there are also secondary reasons for
which legalization of property rights is deemed a necessary precursor to service
provision and other types of investment. These included: legality as a means for
residents to embody a sense of community or identification with their property and
legality as a prerequisite for tax collection necessary for municipal investment. The
underlying assumption within these claims is that residents of these communities do
not feel a sense of attachment or accountability to the land where they have
established homes. In addition, planners and other property administrators within the
state and city governments consistently cite legal property rights as a precursor to
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upgrading. The definition of upgrading varied significantly, ranging from provision of
basic services for illegal settlements upon regularization to modifications of zoning
and land use regulations that would be consistent with long-range plans developed by
the agencies themselves. Without further investigation, including in-depth contact with
the residents of these communities, is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate
about the positionality of the residents who are affected by these practices and
policies.
Within these processes, several practices are apparent: First and foremost is careful
observance of the federal directive that prohibits investment of most federal monies in
property that is being illegally occupied. The paradox of planners relying on titles as a
precursor, however, is that this inevitably leads to a situation in which informal
settlement occurs first without regard to plans and only subsequently are government
officials, in particular planners, allowed to engage with concrete actions in these areas.
Only following settlement and legal recognition are city officials allowed to enter
these areas. This means that although formal comprehensive plans do exist, proactive
planning does not occur in any of the hazard-prone areas, ejido property, or state and
federal reserves since any subdivided settlements on them are technically illegal.
Subsequently, all future development in those areas will almost certainly occur by
retrofitting the spaces after regularization has been completed, which again, in a worst
case scenario, can take more than ten years after the process has been initiated. The
on-the-ground reality in Xalapa, however, reveals a markedly different picture than a
simplistic model of legal and illegal definitions for areas across the urban landscape.
Despite these apparent trends promulgated by government agents based on legal
property rights provision, throughout the course of the study, inconsistencies in
landholding, investment, legal tenure and service provision were continually apparent.
Although the government relies heavily on a discourse rooted in legality, our
interviews indicate a continuum of tenure with regard to land given the fact that
residents are actively settling and investing in landholdings, before legal formal
property titles are granted. In contrast to the administrative and bureaucratic
environments of Xalapa, the populations residing in illegal settlements in the
periphery of Xalapa do not always resemble the transient, predatory populations
discussed within government circles. In most cases, there appears to be little risk of
eviction from these peri-urban zones within the study area, even though individual
property titles had not been issued. This agrees with the discussion earlier regarding
the lack of property rights and regulations enforcement in the country as a whole
according to several federal officials, which was reiterated by a state planning official
in an off-the-record interview. This also confirms findings by a UN Habitat report that
indicates forced evictions are uncommon in practice in Mexico and a more serious
issue resulting from informality is the denial of basic service provision by local
governments (UN HABITAT 2005). It is also relevant to note that according to local
government officials as well as 3 different personal visits, two principal services,
electricity and water, are common in many illegal settlements.  These services are not
publicly funded, but procured via private investment by the national electric company
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(CFE), community mobilization for services and/or local politicians investing in water
and electricity as a means of procuring political support (CORETT pers. comm.).
In the end, the reality in illegal and slum settlements in Xalapa is one in which some
the services that are more difficult to obtain due to government control and or cost of
implementation depend largely on two characteristics of the property resident: their
income and their tenure status, given existing government models for investment
projects. Even though water and electricity might be facilitated prior to legalization,
other services depend more heavily on regularization and individual property titles.
These services include drainage systems, sanitation, trash disposal and improved
social services such as education and health services. Currently, existing government
programs to address urban poverty and development in growing cities in Mexico do
not acknowledge these subtle yet fundamental relationships between legal land tenure
and the issues of citizenship and human rights involved with basic service provision at
the local level.
CONCLUSIONS
The Millennium Development Goals defer implementation power of globally
advocated development objectives to national and local level governments throughout
the world, theoretically allowing the process to be adaptable and participatory in the
hopes of leading to more feasible and effective policies. In the case of Mexico, the
implementation of MDG Goal 7, Target 11 becomes intractably linked to the
legal/illegal binary, which is at the core of discussions about tenure, urban citizenship,
and access to basic services. This analysis highlights the existing binary between
"legal" and "illegal" within government discourse in Mexico and the limitations it
currently presents to contributing to MDG Target 11 in Xalapa and might present to
other externally-conceived development initiatives in the future. This binary, which
stems from a property rights school of thought, results in a situation in which low-
income citizens lack the necessary resources to be able to obtain some or all basic
services which, according to government officials, are only accessible to regularized
properties where individual property titles exist. Despite these limitations, within
informal communities, this paper contends that there is a continuum of land tenure and
service provision in periphery areas of cities in Mexico. This critique is important to
evaluate the existing situation in order to develop feasible policy proposals that can
address improving the lives of slum dwellers in the peri-urban interface of Xalapa.
Currently, the discrepancies between the UN MDG agenda, national government
policy and local reality, specifically with regard to tenure security, underscore the
problem facing urban development initiatives in Xalapa. Not only are the global
citizenship rights, regardless of property ownership, associated with the MDGs and
UN agenda essentially ignored and left unrealized, but simultaneously, government
policies do not take into account local reality to inform necessary public investment
for impoverished urban areas. In Xalapa, the question of what form of tenure is
desirable for which locations remains unanswered and in fact, largely unasked. What
we are left with, is a city where the awarding of tenure rights is slow and inflexible,
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where the enforcement of property rights and regulations is exercised only in the form
of withholding basic services from illegal settlements, and the cost of urban
development and service provision is higher than it needs to be due to the resulting
practice of retrofitting existing settlements rather than planning for future ones.
This case study underscores the existing limitations to achieving both the UN
Millennium Development Goals as well as the current National Development Plan in
Mexico. These discrepancies between discourse and reality result in municipal urban
planning practices that operate retroactively rather than proactively to accommodate
urban growth and augment development and living conditions in the City of Xalapa.
The implication for global urban mandates is clear: dramatic inconsistencies between
global development goals, government policy and local reality should be further
explored and evaluated in the future if new strategies for sustainable urban
development are to be effective.
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Figure 1: Millennium Development Goals and Targets
      Source: MDG Monitor website www.mdgmonitor.org
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Table 1: Availability of Basic Urban Services in Mexico, 1980 – 2000
Source: INEGI, Mexico Census 2000
Figure 2: Xalapa City Boundary 1949 and 2005 and Original Ejido Boundaries
             Data Source: Agrarian Department, Mexico, 1949
             Map Source: Marchal, J. Y. and R. Palma. 1985. Veracruz: Regional Graphic Analysis. Ed.
      INIREBORSTOM. Pg 160.
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TENURE + SERVICES COORDINATION INVESTIGATION
An initiative proposed by the UN Habitat office in Mexico City aims to coordinate the
federal tenure regularization and service provision processes with local regularization
processes in an attempt to channel federal urban improvement funds to illegal
settlements on ejido land faster than is currently possible through the existing
procedure. The five main parties involved in this collaboration would include the ejido
leadership, residents of the illegal settlement, CORETT, (the federal land
regularization organization), the SEDESOL Habitat Program, (the federal entity in
charge of social and urban development) and the local municipal government,
(responsible for official municipal incorporation of newly regularized settlements).
The three steps UN Habitat initially proposes as the foundation of the collaboration are
the following:
1. A legal agreement, signed by all five main parties, to initiate the
regularization process including:
a. Definition of overarching collaboration mission and respective
roles.
b. Understanding that no financial transactions can take place for the
duration of the collaboration to inhibit sales to speculators and
stabilize price/value of the land.
2. Simultaneity of 3 separate regularization processes:
a. CORETT (Federal level)- regularization process
b. SEDESOL Habitat (Federal Level)– funding and installation of
basic services5 and other social and urban development
c. Municipality – incorporation of the formerly illegal settlement into
official municipal plan
3. Signed agreement is returned to the community residents with individual
land titles, the incorporated area officially recognized by the city, basic
services, access to federal development funding in the future, and the
freedom to do what they want with their respective properties.
The UN Habitat’s goal for this initiative is to figure out how it can, with additional
political support from the National Development Plan for 2007-2012, function on the
national scale to change rules of operation and policies for SEDESOL Habitat,
CORETT, and/or the municipality, in areas deemed suited for the collaboration. Part
                                                 
5 In this paper, the term “basic services” includes potable water, electricity, and adequate sanitation and
waste management for each dwelling unit.
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of our fieldwork in Mexico included an investigation specifically geared toward
understanding the feasibility of this proposal.
In order to design a strategy for the three main processes involved in the regularization
of ejido property, (expropriation and regularization, service provision, and municipal
incorporation), to operate simultaneously, we had a number of different meetings with
CORETT, SEDESOL Habitat, and the Xalapa municipal government. At first we
wrote our meeting agendas according to information about the UN’s initiative to
improve the infrastructure in under-serviced periphery settlements with supporting
evidence from the UN Millennium Development Goals, the National Plan 2007-2012,
basic human rights and statistics regarding the negative effects of slum settlements and
rapid urbanization. The initial finding of these meetings included a realization that our
theoretical arguments held little weight and sparked little interest in light of the
existing work plans and regulations of the respective organizations. The institutions
we talked to consistently suffered from a lack of staff, technical expertise, and general
funding to carry out their respective missions with desired timeliness and efficacy –
for an outsiders to walk in and propose an additional burden to their workload was
understandably unwelcome. We also gathered confirmation that currently the three
main regularization procedures never overlap when carried out by these institutions
with which the UN project intends to coordinate. Therefore, the processes work one
after another in a timeframe that could take anywhere from 2 – 10+ years from the
time of the initiation of the regularization process to the installation of basic services
such as water, electricity and sanitation services.
At first, based on our meetings in those offices we determined the lack of institutional
overlap to be a byproduct of three different factors: first, the careful observance of the
federal mandate to not invest federal money in property that is being illegally
occupied; second, a lack of communication and information-sharing between
organizations, and; third, a rhetoric of illegality in reference to both the residents of
illegal communities as well as land speculators (that could potentially have played a
part in their settlement), that prohibits institutional sympathy, prioritization or even
what we would consider adequate attention for periphery settlements, particularly
those on ejido property since they are not recognized by the federal government as
legal.
Simultaneously, we were studying the work plans and timelines of each organizational
process involved in order to identify opportunities for overlapping work and
information sharing. Upon examination of this data, however, we found that the illegal
settlement of our study site was located within one of the designated work zones of the
SEDESOL Habitat program. Upon even further investigation, we confirmed that
federal funds had been spent on development initiatives and construction projects
directly in and around the illegally settled communities we were studying.
Unfortunately, even after speaking extensively with local and regional administrators
on both sides of this overlap, we have not been able to explain this contradiction and it
still remains a mystery to us. With all the legal and verbal opposition to spending
federal funds in illegal settlements, it is hard to even imagine what the cause of this
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slip-up might be due to besides simple oversight or inter-organizational
communication between the highest ups in the institutions who’s motives and decision
making processes are not always transparent to the regional administrators or people
outside the organization such as ourselves. We were unable to re-connect and meet
with the institutional heads in Mexico City in the time between this discovery and our
departure date.
As a result of this line of investigation, we were ultimately able to determine a specific
point in the larger regularization timeline of potential simultaneity. To our dismay, this
point was so conservative in its lack of willingness to challenge current institutional
work plans or current federal spending policy, that we are not convinced it would
significantly reduce the larger timeline or even require a policy change or a legally
binding agreement. At this point in our research we started to see the benefits of the
top-down approach of simply imposing policy change over our own preference to
grow it from below. This possibility of top-down policy “imposition” rather than
“growth” of the collaboration initiative was presented as a real option by the UN
Habitat coordinators during our final meetings at their Mexico City office. Our UN
counterparts informed us that the UN Habitat program has the legal authority and the
will to impose policy change in Mexico through their own contacts in different
departments of the federal government, though to what extent we are unclear. This
leaves us to question if we were sufficiently radical in our work plan and policy
negotiations with the various institutions and players involved in the regularization
process.
The research and drafting of a legal collaboration agreement that could be utilized for
collaboration during the regularization process proved to be one of the most frustrating
uses of our time in Mexico. Trying to navigate legal rhetoric in Spanish as well as get
face time with attorneys proved to be difficult and thus far, unrewarding. Before we
left we were able to put together a draft agreement with guidance from few different
legal sources to use a tool to talk about the project with various parties, but we weren’t
able to get very specific or professional feedback on the draft before we left. We were
told the attorney in the UN office has had a copy since we left the country but we have
yet to hear from him or her. This is a task that we would have preferred to contract out




COLLABORATION AGREEMENT CELEBRATED BY THE HABITAT
PROGRAM OF SEDESOL, CORETT AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF
XALAPA, VERACRUZ, MEXICO FOR THE PROVISION OF SERVICES
AND REGULARIZATION OF LAND TENURE IN IRREGULAR PERI-
URBAN SETTLEMENTS OF XALAPA
I. Parties
Collaboration agreement observed by the Human Settlements Program of the United
Nations (UN HABITAT) represented by the National Coordinator, the Commission
for the Regularization of Land Tenure (CORETT) represented by ____, the Habitat
Program of the Social Development Secretary (SEDESOL) represented by _____, the
Municipality of Xalapa, Veracruz de la Llave represented by the Mayor and the
residents of the neighborhoods of _____, according to the following background
content, declarations and clauses.
Executers
Human Settlements Program of the United Nations (UN HABITAT)
National Coordinator
Commission for the Regularization of Land Tenure (CORETT)
Federal – Technical Director
State – Technical Director
Social Development Secretary (SEDESOL)
Federal – Habitat Program Director








- General UN data
o Relevant Millennium Development Goals (Goal 7, Point 11, Indicator
32)
o Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- National Development Plan for Mexico
o Axis 3
- Current situation of urban land in Mexico
o Urbanization trends
o Land speculation
o Poverty in peri-urban areas
o Irregular settlements
CORETT
- Date of establishment
- Organizational mission and work procedures
- Applicable federal laws
SEDESOL Habitat
- Date of establishment
- Organizational mission and work procedures
- Applicable laws (Social Development Secretary, Laws of Human Settlements)
Veracruz State and Xalapa Municipality
- Municipalization procedures and responsibilities
- Applicable laws (Law of Regional and Urban Development of the Veracruz
State etc.)
Tronconal I, II, III
- Geographic location
- Current projects of CORETT
- Current projects of SEDESOL
- Other current projects and community partners
Goals and benefits of pilot project
- Recognition of the human rights of all Mexican citizens
- Area regularized and incorporated into the Municipal development plans
o Investment with security in housing, land, and the community
o Reduction of negative environmental impact caused by urbanization
trends without accompanied planning, including irregular settlements
- Services which benefit individual properties as well as the community
- Combat land speculation in peri-urban lands
- Case study that can serve as a model for replication in other parts of Xalapa as
well as other cities in Mexico
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III. Declarations
Declarations of each institution:
The Human Settlements Program of the United Nations (UN HABITAT) declares
themselves responsible for…
- Supervision of pilot project
The Commission for the Regularization of Land Tenure (CORETT) declares
themselves responsible for…
- Continuation of regularization of Tronconal II and III
- Permission to enter of SEDESOL and Xalapa Municipality to carry out their
institutional functions and projects following the "Dictamen de Procedencia"
step within the regularization process which assures that the full regularization
process will occur
- Final report submitted to UN HABITAT
The Social Development Secretary (SEDESOL) declares themselves responsible for…
- Initiation of project development following the CORETT Dictamen
submission
- Project completion in priority zone 30069
- Final report submitted to UN HABITAT
Xalapa Municipality declares themselves responsible for...
- Initiation of municipalization process following the CORETT Dictament
submission
- Final report submitted to UN HABITAT
The residents of the colonias Tronconal III declares themselves responsible for…
- No land sales will occur on this property through the duration of the three
processes until they are awarded a property title from CORETT
- Land taxes will correspond with municipalization processes (?)
Declarations of all parties:
That it is by voluntary acceptance to subscribe to the present collaboration agreement,
to the end of mutually contributing to the accomplishment of the responsibilities and
the promise of mutual support.
That each party will ascribe to communication between the institutions throughout the
duration of the project, sharing of information, community data and geographical data
etc.
That each institution involved will submit a final report to the national office of UN
HABITAT, located in Mexico City, Mexico.
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IV. Clauses
For the completion of the objectives of this agreements, each participant will carry out
the specific programs of their association according to the norms and regulations
stipulated by national, state and local laws applicable to each institution.
The parties will comply with the agreement according to the mutual understanding of
it's intention, conforming to the written and signed document. Any discrepancy that
could occur in the application and completion of this agreement should be resolved
through mutual agreements.
The present agreement will be valid for a period of ___ and will go into effect with the
signatures of the participating parties. Modification or cancellation of the agreement
should be requested by written document from the interested party, at least 60 days
before the anticipated change or cancellation.
THE PRESENT AGREEMENT IS SIGNED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF
XALAPA, VERACRUZ, MEXICO ON THE DAY ___ OF THE MONTH OF
____ OF THE YEAR ____.
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APPENDIX
See electronic files attached
Note: All resources are in Spanish unless otherwise noted
Presentations
American Planning Association Annual Conference, Las Vegas, NV
Research poster presented, April 2008 (English)
UP 418: GIS, Case study of development in two periphery communities in Xalapa
Case study poster presented, December 2007 (English)
INESURE Second National Conference of Urban Land, Chihuahua, Mexico
Research presentation, October 2007
Collected Resources
Cadastre, Xalapa Municipal Office
• Infrastructure maps (AutoCAD)
 Road conditions
 Service networks
 Services networks and road conditions
• Public Works maps (AutoCAD)
 Government administrative buildings
 Public works 2005
 Public works 2006
CIESAS-Golfo (Center of Social Anthropology Investigation and Study), Golf Region
• Map of Xalapa ejido lands, 1949
• Residential Mobility in the Veracruz Metropolitan Zone by H. Rodriguez
COPLADEVER, (State Development Planning Committee). Veracruz State Office
• Basic statistics for the Xalapa Municipality, 2005-2005
• National Road Infrastructure map, projected for year 2012
• National Transportation Arteries Map, 2006
• Population data and projections for Veracruz State 2000-2020
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CORETT, (Commission for the Regularization of Land Tenure), Federal Office
• COMERI program, organizational outline
• CORETT anti-corruption plan, 2006
• General organizational overview (PowerPoint)
• White paper, Operation of Expropriation Decrees, 2006
• Photographs of a land title presentation ceremony, 2006
• SULI, program technical guide, 2007
• SULI, organizational flow chart, 2007
CORETT, Veracruz State Office
• Initial data sheets for regularization in Tronconal communities II and III
• Lot maps of Tronconal I, II, and III (AutoCAD)
• Xalapa City community map including areas regularized by CORETT, 2007
• Xalapa City land use map, 2002
InVivienda, (Veracruz Institute of Urban and Regional Development and Housing)
• Constancia: legal agreement for regularization of a specific lot – used by
owners to prove future ownership in order to solicit basic utilities from service
providers
• Current and projected land use map for Xalapa, 2003
• Periphery highway plans, Xalapa region
• Plans for the Urban Zone of Xalapa-Banderilla-Emiliano Zapata-
Tlalnelhuayocan, Veracruz, 1998 (12 files) and 2003 (5 files)
• Law for Urban and Regional Development of the State of Veracruz, 1999
SEDESOL Habitat, (Secretary of Development, Habitat program), Federal Office
• Current Housing Situation in Mexico, 2006 (English)
• Manual of Regularization Procedures for Urban Development, 2006
• Mexico National Development Plan, 2007-2012
• SEDESOL Habitat Strategic Objectives, 2007-2012
• SEDESOL Habitat general organizational overview, 2007 (PowerPoint)
• SEDESOL Rules of Operation, 2006
SEDESOL Habitat, Veracruz State Office
• Annual Report of Habitat works for 2006
• Summary files of completed works by Habitat program in Xalapa, 2005 and
2006
• Xalapa City map with the work communities of the Habitat program, 2005
UN HABITAT, Federal Office
• The Millennium Development Goals: A Latin American and Caribbean
Perspective, 2005 (English)
• The Political Constitution of the Mexican United States, 2005 (English)
• Mexico: Law, Land Tenure and Gender Review, 2005 (English)
• A Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (English)
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UN HABITAT, Regional Office in Xalapa
• Academic Manual for DEL (Local Economic Development) Workshops, 2006
• DEL: Land and Shelter Development as a result of Planning and Strategic
Management in the State of Veracruz, final presentation, 2007
• Final Report of DEL Workshops, Xalapa, 2007
• Instructional Guide for DEL Workshop, 2006
• Global Campaign for Urban Governance and Security of Housing Tenure,
presentation, 2006
Public Relations Office, University of Veracruz, Xalapa Campus
• GIS Data for Xalapa region produced by SEDESOL, 2006
• Tronconal Territorial Reserve - Technical Profile and Financing, 2003
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Project Description
The maps below exist as a framework for a community needs assessment in the urban periphery of 
Xalapa, Veracruz, Mexico. Xalapa, a medium-sized state capital with a population of approximately 
400,000, has seen aggressive rural-urban migration in recent years.  Uncontrolled growth in legal 
and illegal settlements has caused concern from planners trying to meet the needs of this commu-
nity.  These maps explore relationships between land use and risk, density and utilities, and social 
services and transportation. For the purpose of a comparative analysis between the infrastructure 
available in illegal and legal settlements we have chosen two communities to analyze: the illegal 
settlement of Lomas De Casa Blanca and the legal settlement of Carolino Anaya.
Xalapa Grows
Density and Infrastructure Analysis 
The main differences between the two settlements are in the density and 
sanitation lines.  The legal settlement is mostly low density and has many 
more sanitation lines than the illegal settlement.  However, the illegal 
settlement is mostly medium density and has only one sanitation line.
Land Use Hazards and Road Hierarchy 
Mixed use corridors served by arterials are the predominant feature of both neighborhoods that are otherwise characterized by large residential zones. The 
illegal neighborhood has a scattering of small-scale industrial uses throughout, whereas the legal neighborhood has other mixed use corridors not served 
by major roads, with a smaller scattering of industrial uses. Both neighborhoods face the same hazards within their boundaries; some differences include 
an overlap in the legal neighborhood with a flood prone area and hazaradous slope.  Additionally, a low accessibility zone exists within each neighborhood, 
but is much bigger in the illegal neighborhood; however there is no overlap with the other two threats as found in the far northern tip of the legal neighbor-
hood. 
Transportation and Social Services Analysis 
Thirteen routes in total serve at least one of the two neighborhoods (two serve both), with eight in the legal neighborhood and seven in its illegal equivalent.  Within an easy walking distance of 500 m from bus stops serving routes 
that enter the legal neighborhood, 85.8% of Xalapa’s 274 community services are easily accessible; the equivalent for the illegal neighborhood is 77.7%.  However, a significant number of all ten service types still remain within easy 
access for residents of both neighborhoods.The maps on the right show the amount of provided access to social services within the two settlements. Legal Settlement has 1 Bus Station, 19 Bus Stops, 7 Churches, 9 Schools, 1 Sports 
Facility and illegal Settlement has 7 Bus Stops, 8 Churches, 1 Medical Facility, 7 Schools, 1 Sports Facility. Through the findings, it is clear to see that the Legal Settlement not only has more social services within it, there are also 
more bus stops allowing access to services on the outside. There are many social services, according to the map, that lie on the outskirts of the Illegal Settlement; however, they have limited access via bus stops to these services. 
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